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Abstract 
Early modern automata, understood as efforts to ‘model’ life, to grasp its singular properties 
and/or to unveil and demystify its seeming inaccessibility and mystery, are not just fascinating 
liminal, boundary, hybrid, crossover or go-between objects, while they are all of those of 
course. They also pose a direct challenge to some of our common conceptions about 
mechanism and embodiment. They challenge the simplicity of the distinction between a 
purported ‘mechanistic’ worldpicture, its ontology and its goals, and on the other hand an 
attempt to understand ourselves and animals more broadly as flesh-and-blood, affective 
entities (that is, not just breathing and perspiring, but also desiring and ‘sanguine’ machines, as 
La Mettrie might have put it). In what follows I reflect on the complexity of early modern 
mechanism faced with the (living) body, and its mirror image, contemporary theories of 
embodiment. At times, embodiment theory seems to be governed by a fascination with what 
the Artificial Life researcher Ezequiel Di Paolo has called ‘biochauvinism’ (Di Paolo, “Extended 
Life”): an unquestioned belief that ‘living bodies are special’. Yet how does the theorist define 
this special status? The question is apparently a simple one, or at least promptly yields an aporia 
which appears simple: to borrow a provocative phrase from Terry Eagleton, embodiment theory 
is obsessed by the body but terrified of biology. Yet at the same time, at least since Hubert 
Dreyfus and Andy Clark’s groundbreaking works, embodiment has been a legit part of cognitive 
science, yielding the even more recently emerged field of ‘embodied cognition’ (see the work of 
Larry Shapiro), which seeks to depart from traditional cognitive science, especially the latter’s 
understanding of cognition as computational, in order to instead underscore “the significance of 
an organism’s body in how and what the organism thinks,” in Shapiro’s words.  
 
 
Introduction 
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In what follows I reflect on a conceptual pair that is not, at first sight, a piece of delightful 
symmetry: mechanism and embodiment. I first examine the complexity involved in early 
modern mechanistic approaches to organic life (contrary to some popular misconceptions), and 
then ask what they imply for our understanding of embodiment. Conversely, I examine in 
addition some of the core claims in contemporary embodiment discourse and subject it to some 
critical evaluation with regard to its potential anti-naturalism. What happens conceptually when 
we try and take account of the reality of actual mechanisms, but also of the reality of 
embodiment? Embodiment can be a challenge to mechanistic models, not just in a negative 
sense as in the usual ‘mere machines or mechanical models of life cannot grasp (fill in your 
favorite feature of embodied, personal, fleshly features of life)’, but also in a positive sense, as a 
kind of explanatory challenge that, I will suggest, spurs on the elasticity and ambition of the 
mechanistic project, as we shall see below with the ‘marveling’ at Vaucanson’s mechanical duck, 
but also in the irreducibly organic quality of La Mettrie’s ‘man-machine’.  
To paraphrase a Deleuzo-Spinozian slogan, how much can mechanistic explanation do? If we 
look at the functional dimension of machines, which itself opens onto to what we might call 
‘teleomechanism’ (discussed below with respect to models of organism such as the ‘animal 
economy’, especially in 18th century vitalism,1 which are ultimately structural, in the sense that 
they study the properties of a system of interacting parts), the answer is: quite a bit. I conclude 
with some general reflections pointing to an ‘affective’ idea of the machine (shades of what 
Deleuze and Guattari, in the early 1970s, called “desiring machines”).  
Some of my suggestions regarding mechanism and embodiment are not dissimilar to the more 
peremptory statements made by Donna Haraway in her famous “Cyborg Manifesto”:  
American radical feminists . . . insist on the organic, opposing it to the 
technological. . . . But there are also great riches for feminists in explicitly 
embracing the possibilities inherent in the breakdown of clean distinctions 
between organism and machine and similar distinctions structuring the Western 
self. It is the simultaneity of breakdowns that cracks the matrices of domination 
and opens geometric possibilities.2 
1. 
Thirty years after Donna Haraway’s ambitious, programmatic and somewhat polyphonous 
“Cyborg Manifesto” – both a plea for hybridity and a kind of performative/enactive proof of its 
claims which points to the ‘cyborgization’ of reality everywhere around us –  it may not be easy 
                                                          
1
 Ménuret de Chambaud, “Œconomie Animale”; Wolfe and Terada, “The animal economy.” 
2
 Haraway, “Cyborg Manifesto,” 174. Haraway celebrates the overcoming of boundaries (animal/human, 
machine/organism, and of course gender boundaries.) But my concern is not with charting a new, biology-friendly 
course for North American feminism, although this relates to my final remarks on embodiment and its mystification 
(for some discussion of this debate, see Davis, “New Materialism and Feminism's Anti-Biologism”). 
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to restore the habits of mind in which the machine and the body are opposed. But such habits 
are still firmly entrenched in embodiment discourse; in scholarship which targets, e.g., an 
apparently dogmatic Cartesian mechanism which treats living bodies like machines (“As a 
machine, the body became objectified; a focus of intense curiosity, but entirely divorced from 
the world of the speaking and thinking subject”3); and in many writings dealing with the theory 
of organism and organismic biology, which I have also worked on but which shall not be my 
concern here. These firmly entrenched habits reflect something of a failure to recognize or 
appreciate the flexibility, productivity and ‘tolerance’ (both at the ontological and at the 
explanatory levels) of mechanistic projects. In that sense, we need some clarification of what 
early modern mechanism could mean.  
Major figures of mechanism in early modern medicine (or ‘iatromechanism’), such as Boerhaave 
and sometimes Borelli, do speak of the mathematically specifiable mechanical properties of the 
bodies they study as laws of nature, since these ensure that the appeal, e.g. to the functioning 
of a pump or a sieve to explain a heart or a liver, is backed up by further guarantees. But what is 
their overall mechanistic commitment? This ranges from the idea of the world as a machine 
(clockwork, design) to a mechanistic ontology of the particles or components that compose the 
physical world, to – more interestingly for present purposes – an interest in the heuristic 
potential of mechanism, e.g. automata (from Descartes’ fountains to ‘living machines’). This 
heuristic potential is of particular interest because it is both adapted to and challenged by the 
specific reality of embodiment – the challenge of mechanical models faced with the living body. 
Early modern mechanists do not necessarily deny or neglect the specific features of 
embodiment. Either because, like Borelli, they reflect on the “shadowy similarity” between 
automata and living bodies (this is his own term: “automata have a certain shadowy sameness 
(umbratilem similitudinem) to animals in that both are organic self-moving bodies”4). Or 
because they seek to grasp the distinctively functional properties of bodies (as I discuss in the 
next two sections). From automata and man-machines to structural models of organism like the 
animal economy, there is a fascination with the ‘challenge of Life’. Witness this description of 
Vaucanson’s digesting duck by the Oxford literary scholar Joseph Spence, in 1741: 
If it were only an artificial duck that could walk and swim, that would not be so 
extraordinary: but this duck eats, drinks, digests and sh-ts. Its motions are 
extremely natural; you see it eager when they are going to give him his meat, he 
devours it with a good deal of appetite, drinks moderately after it, rejoices when 
he has done, then sets his plumes in order, is quiet for a little time, and then does 
what makes him quite easy.5 
                                                          
3
 Sawday, The body emblazoned, 29. 
4
  Borelli, De motu anim., II, prop. CXVI, 164; On the Movement of Animals, 319. 
5
 Spence, Letters from the Grand Tour, 413-414, cit. Kang, Sublime Dreams, 104. 
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This is quite different from a picture we may have, of ‘dead mechanism’. For indeed, at least as 
far back as Friedrich Engels6 (leading to a commonplace in 20th century Marxist discourse but 
also, in a kind of development that is not aware of its origins, in recent theoretical moves such 
as ‘new materialism’), there is an opposition between a misguided mechanistic standpoint and a 
better, organismic and/or humanist perspective (famously so in Sartre). 
Hermann von Helmholtz, in “On the Interaction of Natural Forces,” makes a version of Engels’ 
classic point, appealing less to the advances of nineteenth-century biochemistry and more to 
thermodynamics, except his target is not the materialists of the previous century, but its 
automata: 
To the builders of automata of the last century, men and animals appeared as 
clockwork which was never wound up, and created the force which they exerted 
out of nothing. They did not know how to establish a connexion between the 
nutriment consumed and the work generated. Since, however, we have learned 
to discern in the steam engine this origin of mechanical force, we must inquire 
whether something similar does not hold good with regard to men.7 
 
Both Engels and Helmholtz are mistaken, however. I shall address their different versions of this 
‘enhanced life science’ standpoint on the previous century, in turn. 
 
2.  
First, as regards materialism: it actually reacts quite often against the strictures of 17th century 
mechanism, even if core vitalist concepts such as the ‘animal economy’ are not strictly, or 
wholeheartedly, anti-mechanist. For example, Denis Diderot insists on “what a difference there 
is between a copper or silver watch, and a living watch,” as he put it in his late, unfinished 
manuscript on the ‘elements of physiology’ (Éléments de physiologie, DPV XVII, 335). Elsewhere 
in the same text, he writes that an instrument made of wood or iron cannot feel, while an 
instrument made of flesh can feel (citation in final version). 
                                                          
6
 “The materialism of the past century was predominantly mechanistic, because at that time ... only the science of 
mechanics ... had reached any sort of completion.... For the materialists of the eighteenth century, man was a 
machine. This exclusive application of the standards of mechanics to processes of a chemical and organic nature – 
in which the laws of mechanics are also valid, but are pushed into the background by other, higher laws – 
constitutes the specific (and at that time, inevitable) limitation of classical French materialism” (Engels, Ludwig 
Feuerbach, 278). For my criticisms of this point see “The Allure of the Flesh and the Vitality of Materialism: Aporias 
of Embodiment.” 
7
 Helmholtz, “On the Interaction of Natural Forces,” 36, in Kang, Sublime Dreams, 230-231. 
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But what is this difference between a copper and a living watch, or a metal clamp and flesh-and-
blood hand? It is not because of some kind of innate Aristotelian teleology in the flesh which is 
lacking in the iron or the wood. Recall Aristotle’s influential argument for why a hand separated 
from the body is no longer a hand: the material structure of a part per se matters less than 
‘where’ it is: “Blood will not be blood, nor flesh flesh, in any and every state.” A hand can only 
be understood as a hand inasmuch as it belongs to an ensouled body, i.e., matter animated by a 
form. Thus the material part, the hand, is derivative of the formal part, the soul. It is precisely 
this mere homonymy between a ‘dead’ hand and a ‘live’ hand which materialists miss, in 
Aristotle’s view. If each animal and part would be defined by shape and colour, “Democritus 
would be right”; but “the dead man has the same conformation of shape [as a man], but 
nevertheless is not a man.”8 
Instead, the difference between copper and living watches, in Diderot, is twofold: (i) in types of 
arrangement and (ii) in the type of matter itself (including the difference between merely spatial 
contiguity and specifically organic continuity as Diderot presents in Le Rêve de D’Alembert, 
insisting that mere contiguity lacks ‘network’ properties, which a designer of neural networks 
might, or might not object to). The latter difference is also asserted by La Mettrie in L’Homme-
Machine: “The body is but a watch, whose watchmaker is the new chyle”; he adds that 
“Nature’s first care, when the chyle enters the blood, is to excite in it a kind of fever which the 
chemists, who dream only of retorts, must have taken for fermentation. This fever produces a 
greater filtration of spirits, which mechanically animate the muscles and the heart, as if they had 
been sent there by order of the will” (La Mettrie, L’Homme-Machine, 105). Very summarily, La 
Mettrie is playing on the most classic mechanistic analogy (the watch or clock) and infusing the 
clockwork with living chemistry (chyle is the vital substance in organic chemical processes). 
Do these differences between a copper watch and a living watch, or between an ordinary 
machine and a self-organizing machine powered by chyle, amount to an ontological difference? 
In fact, early modern mechanists do not seem to insist on such an ontological difference (and 
nor do eighteenth-century vitalists in their focus on the organism, contrary to an equally 
common misconception), although an interesting passage in a 1640 letter from Descartes to 
Mersenne may run counter to this. Descartes himself toys with the opposition between 
machine and organism, or mechanical matter and living flesh, as precisely playing out at 
different levels: empirically (as in Helmholtz’s comment on automata and bodies) and 
ontologically (as in Diderot’s comment on flesh watches and wooden clamps, with its faint 
Aristotelian resonance). In Descartes’ terminology, the different levels are called physical (or 
moral) and metaphysical: "Speaking as a metaphysician, one might well build a machine that 
supports itself in the air like a bird, because birds, at least according to me, are such machines. 
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 Respectively, Generation of Animals I 18, 722b34; Metaphysics Z 11, 1036b32; Parts of Animals I 1, 640b29, b35. 
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But not speaking physically or morally, because it would take springs so subtle and overall so 
strong, that they could not be made by men.”9  
Rather, there is an insistence on complexity, structural and functional concepts, what I’ve called 
elsewhere, borrowing Timothy Lenoir’s term but applying to an earlier period with a subtly 
inflected meaning, ‘teleomechanism’10. That is, on an explanation of systems (whether these be 
machines, automata or living bodies) which blend teleological features such as an appeal to 
purpose and function, and mechanistic features such as an account of their material properties 
and the interaction of their components. 
As such, it is not just because later figures such as La Mettrie and Diderot seem, not just 
cognizant of but deeply concerned with ‘the flesh’, as Merleau-Pontyan phenomenologists 
might call it (relying on an opposition between Leib, the flesh as body possessed of subjectivity, 
and Körper, the mere physical body in space), that our historiography and our intellectual 
categories need improving on, especially compared with the picture painted by Engels and 
Helmholtz. It is also because there is no such thing as pure, blind, cold mechanism. And even 
when the body is treated mechanistically by the poster child of iatromechanism, Descartes, it is 
at the very least in a “systemic” sense, as Barnaby Hutchins has emphasized: “instead of 
reduction to corpuscular mechanics, Descartes explains the operation of the body through 
whole systems whose components exist at different levels (for at least some, central cases).”11 
Hutchins is influenced by some of the recent literature on mechanisms, e.g. Stuart Glennan: 
The complex-systems approach to mechanisms does not suppose that unification 
derives from unity of fundamental mechanisms. According to the complex-
systems approach, mechanisms are collections of parts and parts are objects, but 
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 “on peut bien faire une machine qui se soutienne en l’air comme un oiseau, metaphysice loquendo 
[metaphysically speaking], car les oiseaux mêmes, au moins selon moi, sont de telles machines, mais non 
pas physice ou moraliter loquendo [speaking physically or morally, i.e. in practice], pour ce qu’il faudrait des 
ressorts si subtils, et ensemble si forts, qu’ils ne sauraient être fabriqués par des hommes” (Descartes to Mersenne, 
30 August 1640, AT III, 163. Not in CSM). I consulted the translation in D. Des Chene, Spirits and Clocks, 110, n. 9 
(thanks also to Barnaby Hutchins). 
10
 Timothy Lenoir, “Teleology Without Regrets” and The Strategy of Life; Charles T. Wolfe, “Teleomechanism 
redux?”. 
11
 Hutchins, “Mechanism and multilevel systems,” 671. He adds that “Descartes cannot give an account of the 
heartbeat without also referring to and relying on everything involved in respiration and circulation. Each plays 
a necessary role in explaining how the heartbeat works: in the absence of circulation or respiration, there would be 
no heartbeat. And each plays its role within a specific organisation: if respiration did not precede the entry of blood 
into the left ventricle, the blood would be ‘too rare and too fine’ for the process to continue; if circulation did not 
follow the active phase of the heartbeat, there would be no blood to re-enter the heart” (676); this describes a 
system. A systemic explanation rather than a pure mechanist-reductionist explanation, involves “the entire 
composition that explains the effect (rather than the behaviour of individual corpuscles), where each component is 
taken from the level that is explanatorily relevant for that component” (687). 
7 
 
the objects that are parts of mechanisms may themselves be complex 
structures.12  
 
3.  
Even pure forms of mechanism, if they exist, have a functional dimension, visible in the 
increasing focus on (a) the structure (or ‘fabric’) and purpose of the body, (b) its description in 
purposive terms, and (c) properly teleomechanist descriptions of “the human machine” as an 
integrated system of mechanisms and higher purposes, the “animal economy.” And my final 
point shall be that this ontology responds in ways we might not have expected to the challenge 
of embodiment. 
Consider Richard Lower’s Tractatus de Corde (1669): 
I must preface my account of (the movement of the blood) by some remarks on 
the Position and Structure of the heart. When these have been duly considered 
and collated, it will be easier to grasp how carefully both its Fabric and Position 
are adapted for movement, and how fittingly everything is arranged for the 
distribution of the blood to the organs of the body as a whole.13 
 
The language of ‘position’, ‘structure’, ‘fabric’ is quite striking here. These are not notions one 
can derive from basic atomic properties! Of course, the more the emphasis is on a kind of 
interconnection (called sympathy, consensus, cohesion, etc., with often chemical specifications 
such as the notions of action and reaction) rather than the nature of the components, the 
further away we are from a componential, mechanistic ontology, in the sense of e.g. this classic 
statement by Descartes: 
I think that all these bodies [sc. salt, sulphur, mercury and the four elements of 
the philosophers] are made of the same matter, and the only thing which makes 
a difference between them is that the tiny parts of this matter which constitute 
some of them do not have the same shape or arrangement as the parts which 
constitute others.14 
 
Moving into the eighteenth century, we can see this in the attempts by a series of authors, 
including vitalist physicians associated with the Montpellier Medical Faculty but also 
Maupertuis, to model the structural, systemic and ‘network’ quality of the living organism 
(often, the human or animal body), using the language of the ‘animal economy’. Interestingly, 
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 Glennan “Rethinking mechanistic explanation,” 352. 
13
 Lower, Tractatus de Corde, 2. 
14
 Letter to Newcastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV, 568. 
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this modeling often employed the metaphor of a bee-swarm (i.e., one organ is to the whole 
organism as an individual bee is to the bee-swarm).15 
The more the emphasis is on interconnection, the further away we are from a componential, 
mechanistic ontology (more of a relational property16). Not necessarily because what we are 
seeing in the appeal to “commixture”, “mutual influence”, “action and reaction” is a rival 
ontology (i.e. organismic ontology as opposed to mechanistic ontology). But because it is not an 
ontology. Mechanism, whether in its pure or complex forms, has a functional and systemic 
dimension, and the more it emphasizes the latter, the more it moves away from being a pure 
ontology. I hope this point is clear, but we should not lose of the other key feature I have 
mentioned: embodiment. Because, as in my response to Engels and Helmholtz, it is not true to 
claim that early modern materialists (including ones who admired Vaucanson, like La Mettrie 
and Diderot) were blind to the reality of embodiment. And these features are more related than 
we might think, because analogical and otherwise heuristic appeals e.g. to automata (but also 
the internal rhetoric of an inventor like Vaucanson about his digesting duck) were often ways of 
seeking to do justice to the unique properties of organic bodies. 
 
4. The relation between mechanical analogies and embodiment can also be presented as a 
response to a challenge, and it shows its complex relation to embodiment.17 Borelli, like 
Descartes before him and Vaucanson after him, emphasizes that part of the significance of 
artificially created mechanical objects (including but not restricted to automata: it can also be a 
clock or a pump) is that they enable a further theoretical but more generally cognitive 
engagement with the properties of natural objects. The machine here is functioning as a kind of 
go-between, enabling the interface between ontology and heuristics, within which actual 
machines can serve as ‘matière à penser’, so to speak. In Georges Canguilhem’s elegant phrase: 
“Essentially, a machine is a mediation or as mechanics say, a relay (relais).”18 
Notice how far a machine as ‘relay’ or analogy is, from the stark opposition between ‘a watch 
made of copper and a watch made of flesh’, in Diderot’s evocative image. The more analogical it 
is, the more it can serve as a heuristic: in Borelli’s words which I have quoted earlier, “automata 
have a certain shadowy sameness (umbratilem similitudinem) to animals in that both are 
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 Ménuret, “Observation,” 318b-319a and “Œconomie Animale”; Diderot, Rêve de D’Alembert, DPV XVII, 121-123; 
Wolfe and Terada, “Animal Economy”; Sheehan and Wahrman, Invisible Hands. 
16
 This portrayal of mechanism as applied to the body, as increasingly structural and relational, could perhaps be 
fruitfully compared to Eric Schliesser’s account of gravity as a relational property (“Without God: Gravity as a 
Relational Quality of Matter in Newton”; thanks to Dana Jalobeanu for this suggestion). One difference is that in 
the latter case, gravity is relational, it is an ontology, whereas here there is a gradual move away from ontology in 
favor of description of systems.  
17
 I have devoted more attention to this specific issue in my “Le mécanique face au vivant.” 
18
 “Aspects du vitalisme,” La connaissance de la vie, 87. 
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organic self-moving bodies.” Similarly, automata could be fascinating both because they were a 
form of mechanism, and because they called attention to the specifically ‘vital’ (teleological, 
purposive, intentional, homeostatic …) properties of living beings. As Riskin put it, discussing 
Vaucanson’s digesting or defecating duck,  
The defecating Duck and its companions commanded such attention, at such a 
moment, because they dramatized two contradictory claims at once: that living 
creatures were essentially machines and that living creatures were the antithesis 
of machines.19 
 
For La Mettrie, as we have seen, our machine is very much an organic machine, a flesh and 
blood system. It is a ‘machine’ in the sense that our drives, our urges, our instincts, our 
hormones, our blood sugar, and as the Ancients would have said, our youth or senescence (just 
the sort of thing the embodiment theorist would dwell on!) don’t allow us to function in a kind 
of absolute freedom. This machine is not one that boils down to a foundationalist ontology of 
the sort we today might call physicalism… 
Similarly, however much mechanist language is present in some of the vitalist accounts of the 
animal economy, the latter authors – the first to be clearly termed ‘vitalists’ – also stress, not 
mysterious vital forces, not a Stahlian soul powering the body, but a specifically (and ‘real’) 
organic structure: “They [sc. the mechanists, CW] did not even pay attention to the organic 
structure of the human body which is the source of its main properties.”20 
The fear of the ‘dehumanizing’ force of the machine with regard to the warm world of the 
organic turns out to be misplaced, on the basis of an overview of some key texts spanning 
disciplines such as medicine, philosophy and, well, emerging robotics (the duck). But the 
embodiment theorist could respond that the real issue is not the opposition between the 
mechanical and the organic, but the lack of recognition of ‘selfhood’ in even these complexified, 
hybridized forms of mechanism: even a detailed account of “organic structure” does not seem 
to yield the sense that ‘someone is home’. And often, embodiment is meant to connote a sense 
of first-personness, as opposed to the “body-as-organism of biology,” associated with 
externality. Thus Karen Dale distinguishes between two ways of conceptualizing the body:  
These are, first, the historical body – a body recognised as being constructed 
differently over time through social and cultural forces; and, second, the 
phenomenologically lived body – the body we experience in our everyday lives as 
the medium through which we 'know' our world. Taken together, these 
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 Riskin “The Defecating Duck,” 612. 
20
 Ménuret, “Œconomie Animale,” Enc. XI, 364b 
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approaches to the body may be distinguished from the body-as-organism of 
biology by using the term 'embodiment'. 21 
 
There are several possible responses here. One is to insist that early modern materialism was in 
fact strongly concerned with embodiment and the nature of the flesh, in contradistinction to 
more austere forms of mechanism (and the mind-body dualism they could include).22 Another is 
to point to the richness of these forms of mechanism and the conspicuous fact that, e.g. when it 
came to projects for automata such as Vaucanson’s ‘defecating duck’, the specific nature of 
organic life was the challenge, not what was denied, as I have sought to make clear above. A 
third is to inquire into exactly what is being defended by embodiment theorists, aside from the 
by now rather obvious or ‘granted’ fact that bodies have a history and perhaps a historicity, and 
a degree of self-construction as well as their “genetic” basis.23 It is to this that I turn in closing. 
 
5. 
Consider the difference between these three claims for embodiment: (i) an American teenager 
and a medieval peasant, an obese person and a rail-thin chain smoker are not in their body in 
the same ways: both at the level of self-perception and of historicity. An X-Ray or an MRI scan 
do not access what is in each case unique and personal to the lived body; (ii) a “reluctance to 
conceive of cognition as computational and [an] emphasis on the significance of an organism’s 
body in how and what the organism thinks”24; here, the idea is that the properties of an 
organism’s body limit or constrain the concepts an organism can acquire: “An organism’s body 
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 Dale, “The Body and Organisation Studies,” 11. 
22
 I have tried to do this in “The Allure of the Flesh.” 
23
 An elegant statement, although perhaps so broad as to no longer be a definition, was Caroline Walker Bynum’s: 
“There is no clear set of structures, behaviors, events, objects, experiences, words, and moments to which body 
currently refers. Rather, it seems to me, the term conjures up two sharply different groups of phenomena. 
Sometimes body, my body, or embodiedness seems to refer to limit or placement, whether biological or social. 
That is, it refers to natural, physical structures (such as organ systems or chromosomes), to environment or 
locatedness, boundary or definition, or to role (such as gender, race, class) as constraint. Sometimes-on the other 
hand-it seems to refer precisely to lack of limits, that is, to desire, potentiality, fertility, or sensuality/sexuality . . . 
or to person or identity as malleable representation or construct. Thus body can refer to the organs on which a 
physician operates or to the assumptions about race and gender implicit in a medical textbook, to the particular 
trajectory of one person's desire or to inheritance patterns and family structures” (“Why All the Fuss about the 
Body?”, 5). 
24
 Shapiro, “The Embodied Cognition Research Programme,” 338. This approach to cognition overlaps with 
Malafouris & Renfrew’s beautiful analyses of the ‘cognitive life of things’ I cannot go into here: “Our vision of the 
cognitive life of things is inspired more by the hybrid image of the potter skilfully engaging the clay to produce a 
pot, than by the linear architecture of a Turing-machine” (“The Cognitive Life of Things: Archaeology, Material 
Engagement and the Extended Mind,” introduction to Malafouris & Renfrew, The cognitive life of things, 3); “Things 
have a cognitive life because intelligence exists primarily as an enactive relation between and among people and 
things, not as a within-intracranial representation” (ibid., 4). For further discussion see Wheeler, “Mind, things and 
materiality.” 
11 
 
in interaction with its environment replaces the need for representational processes thought to 
have been at the core of cognition. Thus, cognition does not depend on algorithmic processes 
over symbolic representations,” and “The body or world plays a constitutive rather than merely 
causal role in cognitive processing”25; (iii) The body is not in space like a physical object (a claim 
associated with ‘embodied phenomenology’). There are different ways of identifying or dividing 
up these claims. I shall focus on one: the extent to which they are naturalistic, in the sense of 
being compatible with the set of analyses procured at any given time by the natural sciences 
(bearing in mind that naturalism, for instance in Spinoza or John Dewey, can be an impressively 
broad doctrine). 
Claim (ii), which is a summary of the research program known as ‘embodied cognition’, going 
back to early insights from authors such as Hubert Dreyfus and significantly expanded by 
Francisco Varela et al., and later Andy Clark in the 1990s until now, is fully naturalistic; it is 
meant to modify and/or emend work in the cognitive sciences. Claim (i) is not anti-naturalistic 
and is compatible with a weak naturalism, even if it focuses on dimensions of personhood or 
subjectivity which are not themselves accessible to scientific modelling or explanation. 
However, claim (iii), which is characteristic both of a radical strand of post-Husserlian 
phenomenology with Merleau-Ponty and of the current trend known as enactivism, rests on a 
fundamentally anti-naturalistic posit. The same point was made in more humoristic terms by the 
English cultural critic Eagleton (replace ‘postmodernism’ with ‘embodiment theory’): 
Postmodernism is obsessed by the body and terrified of biology. (full citation in 
final version).26 
In a way these two caricatural figures, the media executive and the Indonesian fisherman, 
convey two aspects of recent embodiment theory, which Eagleton has cleverly turned into a 
kind of contradiction. On the one hand, embodiment theory is meant to free us from the 
tyranny of our biology (as exemplified by the media executive); on the other hand, in its 
fascination with the uniqueness of the flesh and its subjectivity, embodiment theory seems to 
hover around the Indonesian fisherman in his ‘materiality’. But let me focus a bit more on the 
implicit tension between ‘biology’ and what some authors (including Dale as quoted earlier) call 
the ‘phenomenological lived body’ – which is, again, a tension involving the commitment to 
naturalism. 
Theorists for whom the experience of the lived body is apart from natural science as a whole 
tend, perhaps unsurprisingly, to sound quite reactive. They want somehow to rescue (an entity? 
an intuition?), maintaining, with Merleau-Ponty, that the ‘flesh’ (as opposed to body in a merely 
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 Shapiro, Embodied Cognition, 4. 
26
 Eagleton, After Theory, 186. 
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spatial sense, like a brick or a glass of water) exists at least in part “outside of physical space.”27 
Thus the living body – indeed, any organism – “is an individual in a sense which is not that of 
modern physics” (ibid., 154). This is anti-naturalistic, but curiously, it is a point frequently 
repeated in enactivist discourse, which seeks to be part of the discussion as to the nature of 
cognitive science. The enactivist leitmotiv is that the world of our experience is inseparably in 
interaction with our physiology, sensory system and the environment: focus on sensorimotor 
activity, life as movement; “Pigeons, for example, bob their heads up and down to recover 
depth information.”28 But there is also a non-naturalistic commitment here. A phenomenology 
of the body is always a subjectivism,29 for any such reflection on ‘corporeity’ treats our self-
awareness as foundational. Differently put, the phenomenologist of the body cannot accept 
that cortical microstimulation, as has been done in experiments with macaque monkeys30, could 
produce a new phenomenology, a new set of memories, etc.  
Lest I sound severe in judging ‘embodied phenomenology’, recall Merleau-Ponty’s sacralization 
of the living organism, which is, to be really specific, a metaphysics of transubstantiation, for he 
equates the sensation of an embodied being to a mystical communion with divine presence.31 
Merleau-Ponty makes the same point without referring to the metaphysics of 
transsubstantiation, but instead to the opposition between ‘third person’ and ‘first person’, in 
which of course he insists – in this more like a ‘vitalist’ than a ‘phenomenologist’ – that I am 
simply unable to understand the body if I think of it from an external standpoint, “therefore the 
body is not an object.”32 Catholic metaphysics aside, we should see what is involved in claiming 
that the organism is not in physical space. The ontological status, the uncaused causal role of 
selfhood here sounds much like early 20th-century entelechies or vital forces. It plays hyper-
interiority against spatiality.  
Instead of safely distinguishing between types of embodiment discourse, and promoting one at 
the expense of the other, it may also be the case that a theoretical insistence on the fact that 
we are indeed creatures of the flesh means that any form of embodiment discourse can tend 
towards a mysticism of the flesh (the wisdom of the body, the body is not in space …), an out-of-
control insistence on subjectivity, first personness, and opposition between flesh and body. Yet, 
thinking back to my three types of embodiment claims, if (i) is less relevant to cognitive and 
biological discussions, and (iii) above – the phenomenological variant – is subjectivist and anti-
naturalistic, a version of (ii) is most interesting, in Andy Clark’s presentation. In fact, Clark 
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 Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, 209. 
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 Shapiro, Embodied Cognition, 64. 
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further complicates my story because he distinguishes between two arguments for 
embodiment, both of which belong to (ii) in my distinction above: 
One of those strands depicts the body as special, and the fine details of a 
creature’s embodiment as a major constraint on the nature of its mind: a kind of 
new-wave body-centrism. The other depicts the body as just one element in a 
kind of equal-partners dance between brain, body and world, with the nature of 
the mind fixed by the overall balance thus achieved: a kind of extended 
functionalism (now with an even broader canvas for multiple realizability than 
ever before).33 
 
‘Body-centrism’ means that the theorist tends towards “biochauvinism” (Di Paolo). This 
is perhaps one further aporia in addition to the others we have encountered… 
 
Conclusion 
If mechanistic theories of the body turned out to be less foreign to embodiment than some of 
the scholarship, a lot of the contemporary theory and perhaps our common intuitions would 
hold, conversely, embodiment theories turned out to often collapse into (or be beholden to) an 
anti-naturalistic mysticism of the flesh. As regards my desire to distinguish the latter theories in 
terms of their more or less strong, weak, or non-existent commitments to naturalism, a final 
observation is that naturalistic versions of embodiment theory are compatible with the 
expanded forms of mechanism described above. The power of mechanistic analogies is not a 
‘denial of the flesh’. That is, the construct known as ‘mechanistic materialism’ is something of a 
conceptual monster, for most early modern materialists were deeply concerned with what we 
would call embodiment – pleasure, the flesh, sensation, organic sympathies, instincts, 
psychosomatic interconnection, the specific nature of the brain, and so on. Embodiment 
theorists (and their close cousin, new materialists) often define themselves in contradistinction 
to “mechanistic materialists”; but in most cases, materialism need not claim that ‘only matter 
exists’; in the elegant terms of John Sutton and Lyn Tribble, it can be “firmly pluralist” in its 
ontologies: “Even if all the things that exist supervene on or are realized in matter, the 
materialist can still ascribe full-blown reality to tables and trees and tendons and toenails and 
tangos and tendencies”; an account including the brain need not exclude “memories, affects, 
beliefs, imaginings, dreams, decisions, and the whole array of psychological phenomena of 
interest to literary, cultural, and historical theorists” (Sutton and Tribble, “Materialists are not 
merchants of vanishing”). In La Mettrie’s words:  
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To be a machine, to feel, to think, to know how to distinguish good from evil, as 
well as blue from yellow, in a word, to be born with an intelligence and a sure 
moral instinct, and to be but an animal, is thus no more contradictory, than to be 
an ape or a parrot and to know how to give oneself pleasure.34 
We are machines, to be sure, but we are necessarily organic, and furthermore, affective 
machines. To risk a curious rapprochement, I believe the early modern mechanist would agree 
with Félix Guattari, for whom,  
As opposed to a thinker such as Heidegger, I do not believe that the machine is 
something which turns us away from being.35 
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